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Abstract—The emergence of cloud computing provides a new computing paradigm for users—massive and complex computing tasks
can be outsourced to cloud servers. However, the privacy issues also follow. Fully homomorphic encryption shows great potential in
privacy-preserving computation, yet it is not ready for practice. At present, secure multiparty computation (MPC) remains the mainly
approach to deal with sensitive data. In this paper, following the secret sharing based MPC paradigm, we propose a secure 2-party
computation scheme, in which cloud servers can securely evaluate functions with high efficiency. We first propose the multiplicative
secret sharing (MSS) based on typical additive secret sharing (ASS). Then, we design protocols to switch shared secret between MSS
and ASS, based on which a series of protocols for comparison and nearly all of elementary functions are proposed. We prove that all
the proposed protocols are Universally Composable secure in the honest-but-curious model. Finally, we will show the remarkble
progress of our protocols on both communication efficiency and functionality completeness.
Index Terms—Privacy-Preserving Computation, Secure Multiparty Computation, Additive Secret Sharing, Cloud Computing.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing as a new computing and data pro-cessing paradigm has significantly influenced the way
we live. By aggregating the virtualized and interconnected
computers and other IT infrastructures, cloud computing
provides the high-quality Internet service with characteris-
tics of on-demand, broad network access, resource pooling,
rapid elasticity and measured service for users [1], [2]. More
concretely, for individuals, cloud computing reduces thresh-
old of accessing to computing resources, eliminates obsta-
cles brought by infrastructures, and make possible complex
tasks such as deep learning [3]. For groups and compa-
nies, cloud computing gives more flexibility in allocating
resources, make them concentrate more on their business,
and cuts expenses. In the past decade, the needs of economy
constantly promoted the development of cloud computing,
which in turn played an important role in integrating social
resources and improving social efficiency.
However, behind such perfect cooperation model, there
are some privacy concerns that cannot be ignored [4]. In
the cloud computing scenario, users inevitably have to
hand over data which contain sensitive information to the
cloud server. This means that cloud servers can access our
privacy data whenever and wherever they like. And as it
turns out, the rise of more and more data breach issues,
such as massive data leakage of facebook impacting 267
million users in 2017, attracts more attention from the public
and drives the implementation of relevant laws [5]. For
instance, General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR), the most
comprehensive and widely applied privacy regulation, im-
plemented in the European Union in 2018, is geared towards
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protecting user privacy and against infringement of data
breach. Nevertheless, merely by virtue of socio-legal, it is
insufficient to provide truly convincing cloud computing
security. Therefore, recent researches on privacy-preserving
computation offered a cryptography way to achieve this and
it was shown on feasible in theoretical.
The most direct idea is to use Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (HE) which happens to coincide with requirement of
cloud computing security: allows performing a series of
certain functions on ciphertext with reserving the ability
to be decrypted. For example, Paillier [6] is one of the
partially homomorphic encryption (PHE) with additive ho-
momorphism. Considering two plaintextsm1 andm2, cloud
servers can compute E(m1 + m2) with E(m1) and E(m2)
without knowing private key under Paillier encryption
scheme. Yet PHE like Paillier allows only one type of op-
eration on ciphertext, and thus is not competent for some of
complex cloud computing tasks. Somewhat homomorphic
encryption (SHE) improves the number of types of opera-
tions comparing to PHE, such as SYY [7], BGN [8], IP [9].
These schemes introduce noise to achieve security, resulting
in the increase of noise on ciphertext with every evalua-
tion. When accumulation of noise on ciphertext exceed a
threshold, ciphertext will lose the ability to be decrypted,
which against the definition of HE. Therefore, SHE limits
the number of operations on ciphertext and the possibility of
fully computation offload. In 2009, a pioneering scheme [10]
proposed by Gentry introduced bootstrapping technique
to eliminate the noise of ciphertext and achieved the first
plausible fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) which can
evaluate any operation on ciphertext for any times. In a
nutshell, bootstrapping means homomorphically decrypt
the ciphertext to get a clean ciphertext that contains no noise
and is decryptable. However, bootstrapping is costly and
takes tens to hundreds of minutes for every ”clean” [11],
[12]. Hence, HE remains a long way to go from theory to
practice.
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Another way is to use secure multiparty computation
(MPC) which allow a group of parties who don’t trust each
other jointly compute a certain function F(x1, x2, · · · , xn)
without revealing their private input xi. MPC first intro-
duced by Yao in his seminal Two Millionaires Problem [13]
has been developed for four decades and a lot of valuable
work for it has emerged. In 1986, Yao proposed a well-
known secure 2-party computation (2PC) technic called Gar-
bled Circuits (GC) [14] where Alice first generate a garbled
Boolean circuit C which represents the function that Alice
and Bob want to perform with their private input, then Bob
receive the circuit C and evaluate it by interacting with Alice.
Later, Ben-Or et al. proposed BGW protocol [15] which allow
parties to evaluate arithmetic circuit consisting of addition
and multiplication. In the privacy-preserving computation
field, the GMW (aka. secret sharing based MPC) paradigm
[16] is usually applied, where users can use secret sharing
technic [17] to share their private data to servers and then
servers evaluate a circuit which represent the function users
want to perform. Although Boolean circuit or arithmetic cir-
cuit that contain only addition and multiplication is Turing-
complete in theoretical, constructing a specific circuit for
nonlinear functions to improve efficiency is still a mean-
ingful work. Many efforts to desgin secure protocols for
nonlinear functions such as comparison, division, exponent,
etc. has been made [18], [19], [20]. However, these schemes
either use Taylor series to fit or directly construct Boolean
circuit, which not only lead to accuracy loss, but also to low
efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to design secure pro-
tocols that generate arithmetic circuit for nonlinear functions
without Taylor series or bit-level operation as with typical
addition and multiplication protocols.
Contribution. In this paper, we propose a secure 2-
party computation scheme, which can be applied in privacy-
preserving computation under the context of cloud comput-
ing. The main contributions can be described as follows:
• Inspired by additive secret sharing (ASS) in the con-
text of MPC, we first introduce the multiplicative
secret sharing (MSS) into secret sharing based MPC.
The shares shared through ASS are with additive
homomorphism, while shares shared through MSS
are with multiplicative homomorphism. It is almost
impossible to give share fully homomorphism, yet it
is possible to give share proper homomorphism at
the right time.
• We design two basic 2PC protocols for switch-
ing shared secret between MSS and ASS, including
SecMulRes that converts shared secret over MSS
to over ASS, and SecAddRes that is the inverse of
SecMulRes.
• Based on above two basic protocols, we design a se-
ries of 2PC protocols for comparison, exponentiation,
logarithm, power, division, product and trigonomet-
ric functions, where both the input and output are
shared secrets, which follows the GMW paradigm.
Finally, we nearly achieve all the elementary func-
tions.
• All of these protocols contain only arithmetic oper-
ation and no bit-level operation or any fitting. This
means that our scheme is not limited to specific float-
ing point precision and avoids the loss of accuracy in
theoretical. Moreover, all the protocols are with con-
stant round complexities and low communications.
• We prove that all the proposed protocols are Uni-
versally Composable secure against the honest-but-
curious model.
Oranization. The organization of this paper is as follows:
We briefly introduce the related work of HE and MPC
in Section 2. The system model and preliminaries are in
Section 3. We formally describe secure protocols for linear
and multiplication in Section 4 and our proposed protocols
can be found in Section 5. The complexity of protocols is
summarized in Section 6. Finally, we give conclusions of
our work in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
In cloud computing, privacy-preserving computation means
that cloud servers can evaluate some functions on ”en-
crypted” user data and return ”encrypted” results to users,
where the term ”encrypted” indicates that the privacy of
data is preserved. There are mainly two methodology which
could achieve it: homomorphic encryption and secure mul-
tiparty computation.
Homomorphic Encryption. Since the term ”homomor-
phic encryption” first proposed by Rivest et al. [21] in
1978, the purist of FHE has never stopped. As the first
attempts of HE, PHE can be divided into two categories:
additive HE and multiplicative HE. RSA is a first public
key cryptography proposed by Rivest et al. [22] in 1978,
later Rivest et al. [21] showed the multiplicative homomor-
phism of RSA and presented the term HE in the same
year. Elgamal [23] proposed another widely used multi-
plicative HE scheme which has higher security than RSA.
The additive HE schemes represented by Paillier [6] mainly
include GM [24], Benaloh [25], OU [26], NS [27], Galbraith
[28] and KTX [29]. Since PHE only support either addi-
tion or multiplication, in some privacy-preserving schemes
using PHE [30], users usually have to undertake part of
or even most of the computing tasks, and cloud servers
fulfil more of an auxiliary role. Before Gentry’s seminal
work in 2009, the development of SHE is very limited,
where BGN proposed by Boneh et al. [8] is one of the
famous SHE schemes, which allow one multiplication and
unlimited addition to be performed on ciphertext. In 2009,
Gentry [10] proposed first FHE scheme in his PhD thesis.
Gentry first showed a SHE scheme based on ideal lattices,
and then introduced bootstrapping technique (also called
decrypt homomorphically) to reduce noise of ciphertext. If
a SHE scheme can evaluate its decryption algorithm, then
this scheme is bootstrappable and can be transform to FHE
scheme through bootstrapping technique. After Gentry’s
work, many SHE schemes have been proposed [31], [32],
[33], [34], and bootstrapping also be used to realize FHE.
Due to the inefficiency of bootstrapping, Brakerski et al.
[35] proposed a leveled-FHE scheme which can evaluate
functions with predefined circuit depth without using boot-
strapping. However, the scheme is hardly considered as real
FHE, it has better performance than other FHE scheme in
some scenario though. At present, FHE is gradually applied
in practice and has great efficiency improvement potential.
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Secure Multiparty Computation. After Yao presented
Two Millionaires Problem [13], he proposed GC [14] which
is one of the first MPC protocols. Later, Beaver et al. [36]
proposed BMR protocols which extend GC from 2PC to
MPC by separating Alice’s task. Since GC is high costly,
many optimization techniques have been proposed to im-
prove efficiency, and could be divided into three categories:
optimization in GC generation [37], [38], optimization in GC
evaluation [36], [39], [40], optimization in protocol level [41].
In GC-type schemes, the parties are the private data owner,
in other words, they know what input data meaning for.
Therefore, Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (GMW) [16]
presented another MPC paradigm in 1987, where every
party first share his private input (into n shares); then
n parties run MPC protocols on shares; finally, n parties
recover results from output shares. Specifically, GMW using
ASS over Z2 to share each bit of input, where oblivious
transfer [42] is used to evaluate AND gate and XOR gate
can be evaluated locally. The GMW paradigm expands the
source of MPC input, that is, allowing private input outside
the parties such as users. Follow this paradigm, Ben-Or et
al. [15] proposed BGW protocol which allow parties evaluate
arithmetic circuit based on Shamir secret sharing [17], where
both addition and multiplication can be evaluated locally.
Since multiplication will double the order of polynomial
and thus the secret cannot be recovered from shares, BGW
introduced degree reduction via resharing shares. However,
this method is not only inefficient, but also limits the thresh-
old of Shamir secret sharing requiring that 2t < n. To solve
this problem, Beaver creatively introduced Beaver triple [43]
generated in offline phase to significantly improve efficiency
of evaluating multiplication. In 2006, Damga˚rd et al. [44]
presented bit-decomposition protocol to convert shared se-
cret over arithmetic sharing to over bitwise sharing. This
technique allows us to combine the advantages of Boolean
circuit and arithmetic circuit. Since then many MPC schemes
based on ASS and bit-decomposition technique have been
proposed [19], [41], [45]. In addition, there are many works
that are dedicated to implement MPC protocols and even
provide secure language to hide details of MPC protocols
[41], [45], [46], [47]. Recently, with the rapid development of
machine learning, many schemes that use MPC technic to
support privacy-preserving for the task have been proposed
[20], [48], [49]. Most of them optimized MPC they used
according to the characteristics of machine learning.
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the GWM paradigm which is
the basis of this paper, the threat model we use, definition
of security, and the secret sharing technic.
3.1 GMW Paradigm
GMW [16] introduced secret sharing in MPC to encrypt pri-
vate input and become a new MPC paradigm called GMW
paradigm. In this paper, we follow the GMW paradigm, and
which can be divided into three stages:
1) All private inputs are shared by their owners. On the
one hand, secret sharing encrypts private data, on
the other hand, it decouples the secret owner and
the sharing holder, i.e., the private data owner
and the party. Therefore, secret sharing expands
input sources, which means that non-parties, such
as users, can provide data to parties, while in MPC
scenarios, the private data owner is equal to the
party. In this paper, the ASS is set to the default
secret sharing technic. Since ASS is a (n, n) thresh-
old scheme, sharing private input entails that every
party holds share of every input.
2) The parties evaluate circuit on shares. In MPC, par-
ties will generate corresponding circuit according to
specific tasks before the execution of protocol, while
in the context of cloud computing, since the party
(i.e., the server) is the outsourcer, the users need
to send the circuit to the parties. Indeed, the users
can also send the function to be executed and the
circuit will be generated by the parties. Regardless
of the data source, the function and its details are
clear and public to parties. This means that users
can only keep data private to the server but not
function private. In this paper, we specify that there
are two parties P1 and P2 (i.e., two servers) due to
the fact that the less servers involved in computing,
the more secure it is for users.
3) The final result is recovered by output shares. After
the evaluating stage, parties will output shares of
result. In cloud computing, these shares will then be
sent back to users. The principle feature of GMW
paradigm is that input and output, including in-
termediate results, are in the form of share, which
is similar to the ciphertext form in homomorphic
encryption.
In GMW paradigm, the main effort (include this paper) is
to design efficient protocols to generate circuit for functions.
Moreover, since the users are not involved in computation,
the number of users and communication between users and
parties are not considered in protocol design.
3.2 Threat and Security Model
Similar to most secret sharing based MPC schemes [16], [19],
[45], the honest-but-curious model (aka. semi-honest model)
is used in this paper, where an honest-but-curious adversary
could corrupt parties before the execution of protocol, in
other words, each party could be seen as honest-but-curious
adversary. An honest-but-curious adversary will abide by
the protocol honestly but will analyze all the data he has as
much as possible. In addition, we assume that two parties
will not collude with each other, which means the one
adversary cannot corrupt two parties at same time.
The real-ideal paradigm firstly presented in [50] is
widely used to prove security of stand-alone MPC protocol.
In the ideal world, there is a trusted third party T who
will receive private input xi sent by every party to compute
F(x1, x2, · · · , xn) and send result to parties. The trusted
third party T is also called ideal functionality F , in other
words, with the help of T , parties securely compute the
function F . In the real world, there is no such T , parties
have to interact with each other to compute F according
to protocol. Roughly, a protocol pi is secure or securely
realize ideal functionality F if the distributions of input
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and output in the ideal world and in the real world are
indistinguishable.
However, the real-ideal paradigm cannot guarantee the
composability of secure protocol, which means that a com-
plex protocol composed of secure sub-protocols is still a
stand-alone protocol and should be proved from scratch.
The Universally Composable (UC) Security framework pro-
posed by Canetti [51] introduced the environment on the
basis of the real-ideal paradigm to give secure protocol with
the composability. A sub-protocol can be considered as the
ideal functionality in proving security, if it is UC-secure. In
this paper, we will prove the security of our protocols under
UC framework and the following security definition will be
used.
Definition 1. A protocol pi is UC-secure or UC-securely
realizes the ideal functionality F if for any real world
adversary A there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time
simulator S that can simulate an ideal world view such
that is indistinguishable from real world view.
To prove that a protocol is UC-secure, it suffices to show
that the incoming view consisting of message sent by other
parties and output is simulatable for any parties (adversary).
In addition, the following lemmas will be used.
Lemma 1. The element x + r is uniformly distributed and
independent from x for any element x ∈ F if the element
r ∈ F is also uniformly distributed and independent
from x [19].
Proof: Readers can refer to the proof in [19].
Lemma 2. The nonzero element x ·r is uniformly distributed
and independent from x for any element x ∈ F if
the element r ∈ F is also uniformly distributed and
independent from x.
Proof: If the nonzero element r ∈ F is uniformly
distributed and independent from all x then so is x · r, since
fr(x) := x · r is a bijective mapping for F.
3.3 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing introduced by Shamir [17] is aimed at ad-
dressing a problem in which the secret data divided into
n pieces can be restored with over a certain number of
pieces, whereas cannot with less of those. Specifically, in
[17], Shamir presented a (k, n) threshold scheme such that:
1) the secret data s which is named secret will be securely
divided into n pieces si which are named shares; 2) any
k shares are able to reveal complete information about
the secret; 3) any k − 1 or less shares reveals no useful
information about the secret. One wants to share a secret
s, he first securely divides secret into n shares si via secret
sharing, then sends them to n parties respectively. Finally,
any k parties can restore the secret s together, whereas any
k − 1 or less parties cannot.
Additive secret sharing (ASS) is defined over a field F. In
ASS, a secret x ∈ F will be randomly divided into n shares
[x1, x2, · · · , xn] such that x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn = x. Specially,
ASS defines a (n, n) threshold scheme, since restoration of
the secret requires all of shares. The secret sharing used in
GMW protocol [16] can be regarded as ASS defined over
a finite field Z2 and is suitable for Boolean circuit. In [19],
[20], [45], [48], [49], ASS defined over a finite ring Z2l or
a finite filed F is used and most of secure operation is on
arithmetic circuit. The defined field for ASS determines the
element form of shares and type of circuit on which parties
want to perform. In this paper, the ASS defined over real
field R is considered, which is adequate for comprehensive
operations on arithmetic circuit.
Inspired by ASS, we introduce the multiplicative secret
sharing (MSS) defined over real field R for the needs of
protocol design. Specifically, in MSS, a secret u ∈ R will be
randomly divided into n shares [u1, u2, · · · , un] such that
u1× u2× · · · × un = u. Similar to ASS, MSS defines a (n, n)
threshold scheme. Note that it is not appropriate to use MSS
defined over some fields such as Z2 due to the fact that once
a share is 0, the party could know the secret is 0.
The original intention of secret sharing is to provide
access control for sensitive data. In this case, the threshold
t should make tradeoff between security and reliability,
where a higher t means more security and less reliability,
while a lower t is the opposite. As a (n, n) threshold scheme,
ASS and MSS obviously sacrifice reliability and thus is not
suitable in this scenario. However, they provide MPC with
capabilities of data encryption and data distribution.
For the sake of brevity, we use [[x]] to denote all of shares
[x1, x2, · · · , xn] generated by the secret x through ASS, and
use 〈u〉 to denote all of shares [u1×u2×· · ·×un] generated
by the secret u through MSS. More precisely, the notation
[[x]] or 〈u〉 mean share xi or ui for party Pi, in other words,
it represents ensemble of individuals.
4 LINEAR AND MULTIPLICATION PROTOCOLS
Secure protocols for addition can be implemented directly
based on additive homomorphism of ASS, meanwhile se-
cure multiplication protocol can be constructed efficiently
with Beaver triple [43]. The implementation of these proto-
cols is not the contribution of this paper, but we still devote
a section here to formally describe them for completeness.
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, secure linear protocol
which further consider the operation of multiplication by
public number takes n shared secrets [[x1]], [[x2]], · · · , [[xn]]
with their public coefficient a1, a2, · · · , an and a public bias
b as input, and return the shared secret [[
∑n
j=1 a
j · xj + b]].
For clarity, superscript here is used to distinguish differ-
ent secrets or public numbers, whereas subscript is used
to represent the share of corresponding party. During the
execution of secure linear protocol, P1 and P2 are only
required to perform same linear operation on their own
shares asynchronously.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 is correct and UC-secure in the
honest-but-curios model.
Proof: For correctness, there are
f =f1 + f2 =
n∑
j=1
aj · xj1 +
n∑
j=1
aj · xj2 + b
=
n∑
j=1
aj · (xj1 + xj2) + b =
n∑
j=1
aj · xj + b
For security, note that Algorithm 1 contains only local
operations and no interaction with each party. Therefore,
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Algorithm 1 Secure Linear Protocol [[f ]] ←
SecLinear([[x1]], [[x2]], · · · , [[xn]], a1, a2, · · · , an, b)
Input: Shared secrets [[xj ]], public coefficient aj for all j ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n} and bais b.
Output: Shared secret [[f ]] such that f =
∑n
j=1 a
j · xj + b.
1: P1 computes f1 ←
∑n
j=1 a
j · xj1.
2: P2 computes f2 ←
∑n
j=1 a
j · xj2 + b.
3: Return [[f ]].
the protocol is perfectly simulatable and is UC-secure in the
honest-but-curios model.
Unlike linear operation, secure protocol for multiplica-
tion cannot be constructed by such intuitive way, since
[[x · y]] = [[x]] · [[y]] fails. In 1991, Beaver [43] presented a
crucial work to solve this problem, where a multiplicative
triple (aka. Beaver triple) is used to assist parties to securely
compute product. The idea of beaver triple has its roots
in a simple but inconspicuous mind: obfuscate inputs and
then use a particular linear combination to correct them.
A Beaver triple consist of three numbers a, b, c such that
c = a · b where a and b are random, and will be generated
and shared by ASS in offline phase. It means that each party
Pi will own shares of input xi and yi and shares of Beaver
triple ai, bi, and ci before the execution of the protocol. In
general, there are two ways to generate and share Beaver
triple in offline phase: 1) done by parties through other MPC
technic [49]; 2) done by trusted third party T [20]. Specially,
in privacy-preserving computation, users can act as trusted
third party.
Secure multiplication protocol takes two shared secrets
[[x]] and [[y]] as input, and return the shared secret [[x · y]].
Firstly, two random number a and b used to mask two
multipliers x and y respectively via computing differences
[[d]] ← [[x]] − [[a]], [[e]] ← [[y]] − [[b]]. Secondly, parties reveal d
and e to make them into public number. Since both a and b
are random and privately shared, revealing d and e leaks no
information about x and y. Now multiply two differences d
and e to obtain d · e = x · y − a · y − b · x+ a · b, where x · y
is result that we want, meanwhile a · y, b · x, and a · b can be
eliminated by e · [[a]], d · [[b]], and [[c]]. Finally, it conclude that
[[x · y]] = d · e+ d · [[b]] + e · [[a]] + [[c]]. The Algorithm 2 shows
the details, where the term e · d can be computed by either
party, and we specify P2 here without loss of generality.
Moreover, secure protocol for product which has more than
2 multipliers can be implemented by recursively splitting
input sequences in half and then computing each pair in
parallel.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 2 is correct and UC-secure in the
honest-but-curios model.
Proof: For correctness, there are
f =f1 + f2
=c1 + d · b1 + e · a1 + c2 + d · b2 + e · a2 + e · d
=c+ d · b+ e · a+ e · d = x · y
To prove security, we first consider the incoming view and
output of P1 and prove that both are simulatable. The
incoming view of P1 is (d2, e2) and the output is (f1), where
d2 = x2 − a2, e2 = y2 − b2, and f1 = c1 + d · b1 + e · a1.
Algorithm 2 Secure Multiplication Protocol [[f ]] ←
SecMul([[x]], [[y]])
Input:
Shared secrets [[x]] and [[y]].
Beaver triple: [[a]], [[b]], [[c]], where c = a · b.
Output: Shared secret [[f ]] such that f = x · y.
1: P1 computes d1 ← x1 − a1, e1 ← y1 − b1.
2: P2 computes d2 ← x2 − a2, e2 ← y2 − b2.
3: P1 and P2 collaboratively reveal d and e.
4: P1 computes f1 ← c1 + d · b1 + e · a1.
5: P2 computes f2 ← c2 + d · b2 + e · a2 + e · d.
6: Return [[f ]]
The values a2, b2, and c1 are uniformly distributed and
independent from any private input, due to Lemma 1, the
incoming view and output is simulatable. Since P1 and
P2 are symmetric in Algorithm 2, it is trivial to build a
simulator S for P2.
5 PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
In this section, we firstly propose two resharing protocols.
Then, based on these, we desgin a series of secure proto-
cols for comparison, exponentiation, logarithm, power and
trigonometric functions. Finally, we discuss the remainder
of basic elementary functinos—inverse trigonometric func-
tions.
5.1 Resharing
MSS described in Preliminaries has multiplicative homo-
morphism different from ASS, and in fact, is the basis
of all the remaining protocols. However, all data (secret)
should eventually return to the form shared by ASS in our
setting, hence the resharing technic which switch shared
secret between MSS and ASS need to be first implemented.
Besides, based on MSS, we can directly construct secure
protocol for comparison.
5.1.1 Multiplicative Resharing
The multiplicative resharing is to convert shared secret over
MSS to over ASS. In fact, it is homologous with of multipli-
cation. Recall that multiplication is essentially to compute
(f1 + f2)← (x1 +x2) · (y1 + y2), where the inputs of P1 are
xi and yi; whereas multiplicative resharing is essentially to
compute (x1 + x2)← (u1 · u2), where the input of Pi is ui.
The outputs of both are isomorphic, while in terms of input,
u1 can be considered as (x1 + x2) and u2 can be considered
as (y1+y2). That is to say, for P1, he has x1 and x2 instead of
x1 and y1, thereby Beaver triple allocation need to change
accordingly. Specifically, a Beaver triple will be generated
and the value c will be shared by ASS in offline phase
as usual. The difference is that the values a and b will be
directly sent to P1 and P2 instead of sharing them, since for
P1, he owns x1 and x2 and hope to get a1 and a2. In other
words, before the execution of this protocol, P1 owns u1, a,
and c1, meanwhile P2 owns u2, b, and c2. As illustrated in
Algorithm 3, at first, P1 computes d ← u1 − a which can
be seen as [[e]] ← [[y]] − [[b]]. Then the values d and e are
revealed by two parties. At last P1 computes x1 ← c1 + e ·a
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Algorithm 3 Secure Multiplicative Resharing Protocol
[[x]]← SecMulRes(〈u〉)
Input:
Shared secrets 〈u〉 over MSS.
Beaver triple: a, b, [[c]], where c = a · b. The value c is
shared by ASS, meanwhile a is held by P1 and b is held
by P2.
Output: Shared secret [[x]] over ASS such that x = u.
1: P1 computes d← u1 − a.
2: P2 computes e← u2 − b.
3: P1 sends d to P2.
4: P2 sends e to P1.
5: P1 computes x1 ← c1 + e · a.
6: P2 computes x2 ← c2 + d · b+ e · d.
7: Return [[x]]
and P2 computes x2 ← c2 + d · b+ e · d respectively, which
can be seen as [[c]] + d · [[b]] + e · [[a]] + e · d. Same as secure
multiplication protocol, the term e · d is specified here to be
computed by P2.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 3 is correct and UC-secure in the
honest-but-curios model.
Proof: For correctness, there are
x =x1 + x2 = c+ d · b+ e · a+ e · d
=c+ u1 · b− a · b+ u2 · a− a · b
+ u1 · u2 − u2 · a− u1 · b+ a · b
=u1 · u2 = u
To prove security, since P1 and P2 are symmetric in Algo-
rithm 3, it suffices to show that the view of P1 is simulatable.
The incoming view of P1 is (e) and the output is (x1), where
e = u2 − b and x1 = c1 + e · a. Since the values b and c1 are
uniformly distributed and independent of any private input,
due to Lemma 1, it is easy to perfectly build a simulator for
P1.
5.1.2 Additive Resharing
Additive resharing which converts shared secret over ASS
to over MSS is defined as the inverse of multiplicative
resharing and secure protocol for it can be constructed by
following Algorithm 3 backwards step by step. In offline
phase, the allocation of Beaver triple is same as Algorithm
3. In online phase, P1 and P2 first compute [[t]] = [[x]]− [[c]].
Note that since the term e · d is assumed to be done by
[[P ]]2, the difference e can then be restored with e ← t1/a.
When P2 receive e from P1, the share of result u2 can be
directly obtained by computing u2 ← e + b and another
difference d can be restored with d ← t2/u2. Lastly, P1
compute u1 ← d+ a after he received d from P2. Algorithm
4 shows full details of this protocol and combines some
computations.
It is worth mentioning that Algorithm 4 includes two
division operations and thus may cause the problem of
division by zero. However, in fact, the cases that a happens
to be 0 or b happens to be (c1−x1)/a are negligible. Another
case needs to point out is that when the input value x = 0
(i.e., x1 = −x2), the share of result
FAR interacts with parties P1, P2, and adversary S.
1. FAR receives xi from Pi for all i = 1, 2.
2. FAR computes x← x1 + x2.
3. FAR chooses random nonzero value u2 ∈ F.
4. FAR computes u1 ← x/u2.
5. FAR sends u1 to P1 and u2 to P2.
Fig. 1. Additive resharing ideal functionality FAR.
Algorithm 4 Secure Additive Resharing Protocol 〈x〉 ←
SecAddRes([[u]])
Input:
Shared secrets [[u]] over ASS.
Beaver triple: a, b, [[c]], where c = a · b. The value c is
shared by ASS, meanwhile a is held by P1 and b is held
by P2.
Output: Shared secret 〈x〉 over MSS such that u = x.
1: P1 computes e = (x1 − c1)/a.
2: P1 sends e to P2.
3: P2 computes u2 ← e+ b, d← d = (x2 − c2)/u2.
4: P2 sends d to P1.
5: P1 computes u1 ← d+ a.
6: Return 〈u〉
u1 =d+ a =
x2 − c2
u2
+ a
=
−x1 − c2
x1−c1
a + b
+ a =
−ac+ a2b
x1 − c1 + ab = 0,
is identically equal to zero. This means that once P1 get
u1 = 0, he can know that the secret value x = 0, but it
is the necessary price of performing this protocol. Even in
the ideal world, one of the parties Pi will get knowledge
of the secret value when it is zero. As illustrated in Figure
1, the ideal functionality FAR which the additive resharing
protocol wants to securely realize describes the behavior in
the ideal world.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 4 is correct and UC-secure in the
honest-but-curios model.
Proof: For correctness, there are
u =u1 · u2 = (d+ a) · (e+ b)
=x2 − c2 + ae+ ab = x2 − c2 + x1 − c1 + ab
=x1 + x2 = x
To prove security, we need to show that both views of P1
and P2 are simulatable. For P2, his incoming view is (e),
where e = (x1 − c1)/a. And for P1, his incoming view is
(d), where d = (x2 − c2)/(e+ b). Since the values a, b, c1, c2
are uniformly distributed and independent of any private
input, due to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the incoming views
of P1 and P2 are simulatable. Besides, it is trivial to see that
the outputs of P1 and P2 can be also simulated.
5.1.3 Comparison
It is easy to see that MSS allows share to reserve the sign
of secret, thus secure comparison can be accomplished via
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Algorithm 5 Secure Comparison Protocol SecCom([[x]], [[y]])
Input: Shared secrets [[x]] and [[y]].
Output: 0 if x = y, 1 if x > y, −1 if x < y.
1: P1 computes d1 = x1 − y1.
2: P2 computes d2 = x2 − y2.
3: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute 〈u〉 ←
SecAddRes([[d]]).
4: P1 and P2 reveal the signs of u1 and u2.
5: if u1 = 0 or u2 = 0 then
6: Return 0.
7: else if (u1 > 0 and u2 > 0) or (u1 < 0 and u2 < 0) then
8: Return 1.
9: else
10: Return −1.
11: end if
additive resharing. As presented in Algorithm 5, P1 and P2
compute the difference [[d]] = [[x]] − [[y]] at first, then call
secure additive resharing protocol to get the difference 〈u〉
over MSS, and after that the sign of 〈u〉 will be revealed
between each party. Since there exists round-off error in
practice, two floating-point numbers are almost impossible
to be completely equal. A precision threshold ∆ could be
set to determine whether two floats are equal, i.e., whether
their difference is reduced to zero. When the signs of all
multiplicative shares are public, parties will arrive at a
consensus over the comparison of two numbers.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 5 is correct and UC-secure in honest-
but-curios model.
Proof: It is trivial to prove the correctness and security
of Algorithm 5, since those of SecAddRes protocol has been
proven.
5.2 Nonlinear Functions
Switching shared secret between two sharing forms as well
as some identities make possible secure protocols for expo-
nentiation, logarithm and power without any approximate
or bit-level operation. In addition, division can be seen as
the special case of power.
5.2.1 Exponentiation
Secure exponentiation is to compute [[f ]]← a[[x]], where a is a
public base number and is usually specified as e. According
to the identity
ax1+x2 = ax1 · ax2 , (1)
when parties perform exponential operation on their shares,
the problem can be transformed into the problem of con-
verting multiplicative shares which has been solved by
SecMulRes. Without loss of generality, Algorithm 6 takes
a secret exponent [[x]] and a public base number a as input,
and return the shared result [[ax]].
In addition, when base number a is negative, inappro-
priate exponent such as 1/2 will lead to a mistake in com-
puting. However, such case should be avoided in designing
function, not be guaranteed of this algorithm.
Theorem 6. Algorithm 6 is correct and UC-secure in honest-
but-curios model.
Algorithm 6 Secure Exponentiation Protocol [[f ]] ←
SecExp([[x]], a)
Input: Shared secret [[x]] and public base number a.
Output: Shared secret [[f ]] such that f = ax.
1: P1 computes u1 ← ax1 .
2: P2 computes u2 ← ax2 .
3: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute [[f ]] ←
SecMulRes(〈u〉).
4: Return [[f ]].
Proof: According to correctness of SecMulRes, we
have
f1 + f2 = u1 · u2,
therefore, the correctness of this algorithm can be proven as
follow
f = f1 + f2 = u1 · u2 = ax1 · ax2 = ax1+x2 = ax.
Since SecMulRes is secure and this algorithm contains no
additional communication, security is trivial.
5.2.2 Logarithm
As the inverse of exponentiation, secure logarithm is to
compute [[f ]] ← loga[[x]], where a is a base number. Similar
to exponentiation, logarithm has its own ”product-to-sum”
identity
loga(u1 · u2) = loga u1 + loga u2. (2)
From this point, parties first call the protocol SecAddRes
to convert additive shares into multiplicative shares, and
then perform logarithmic operation on each share. Since
logarithmic function requires positive input, we have to
make the share absolute in advance. It means that what we
actually designed is the secure function [[f ]] ← loga |[[x]]|,
and which is more reasonable. Note that the steps of
SecLog are exactly the opposite of SecExp, in which the
steps of SecAddRes and SecMulRes they called are also
opposite.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 7 is correct and UC-secure in honest-
but-curios model.
Proof: For correctness, there are
f = f1 + f2 = loga |u1|+ loga |u2| = loga |u1 · u2|,
due to the correctness of SecAddRes, we have
f = loga |u1 · u2| = loga |x1 + x2| = loga |x|.
Since SecAddRes is secure and this algorithm contains no
additional communication, security is trivial.
5.2.3 Power
Secure power is to compute [[f ]]← [[x]]α, where α is a public
integer. Inspired by the identity
(u1 · u2)α = uα1 · uα2 , (3)
we can first turn shares into multiplicative shares, then
perform power operation on each share, and finally turn
shares back to additive. In fact, the above identity also holds
for multiple multipliers, in other words, multiplication and
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Algorithm 7 Secure Logarithm Protocol [[f ]] ←
SecLog([[x]], a)
Input: Shared secret [[x]] and public base number a.
Output: Shared secret [[f ]] such that f = loga |x|.
1: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute 〈u〉 ←
SecAddRes([[x]]).
2: P1 computes f1 ← loga |u1|.
3: P2 computes f2 ← loga |u2|.
4: Return [[f ]].
Algorithm 8 Secure Power Protocol [[f ]] ←
SecPow([[x1]], [[x2]], · · · , [[xn]], α1, α2, · · · , αn)
Input: Shared secrets [[xj ]] and public integers aj for all j ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n}.
Output: Shared secret [[f ]] such that f =
∏n
j=1 x
ja
j
.
1: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute 〈uj〉 ←
SecAddRes([[xj ]]) for all j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} in parallel.
2: P1 computes v1 ←
∏n
j=1 u
j
1
aj
.
3: P2 computes v2 ←
∏n
j=1 u
j
2
aj
.
4: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute [[f ]] ←
SecMulRes(〈v〉).
5: Return [[f ]].
power are to MSS what linear is to ASS. For n multipliers,
we have
(u11u
1
2u
2
1u
2
2 · · ·un1un2 )α = (u11u21 · · ·un1 )α ·(u12u22 · · ·un2 )α. (4)
Therefore, as shown in Algorithm 8, we design secure
power protocol which implements secure function [[f ]] ←∏n
j=1 [[x]]
ja
j
. Note that division is the special case of power,
i.e., SecPow([[x]],[[y]],1,−1), and product is also the special
case, i.e., SecPow([[x1]],[[x2]],· · · ,[[xn]],1,1,1,· · · ,1).
In addition, when the exponent α is a real number or
even a shared secret, this algorithm no longer applies. We
discussed both cases in the Appendix.
Theorem 8. Algorithm 8 is correct and UC-secure in honest-
but-curios model.
Proof: For correctness, there are
f = f1+f2 = v1 ·v2 =
n∏
j=1
uj1
aj ·uj2
aj
=
n∏
j=1
uj
aj
=
n∏
j=1
xj
aj
.
Since SecAddRes and SecMulRes are secure and this al-
gorithm contains no additional communication, security is
trivial.
5.2.4 Trigonometric Functions
Trigonometric functions which contain sine, cosine, tangent,
cotangent, cosecant and secant describe the relationship of
an angle and two edges of a right triangle. We first design
secure protocols for two basic functions: sine and cosine,
then discuss the remains.
Secure sine is to compute [[f ]]← sin[[x]]. Considering the
angle sum and difference identity
sin(x1 + x2) = sinx1 · cosx2 + cosx1 · sinx2, (5)
Algorithm 9 Secure Sine Protocol [[f ]]← SecSin([[x]])
Input: Shared secret [[x]].
Output: Shared secret [[f ]] such that f = sinx.
1: P1 computes m1 ← sinx1, n1 ← cosx1.
2: P2 computes n2 ← sinx2,m2 ← cosx2.
3: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute [[fm]] ←
SecMulRes(〈m〉), [[fn]]← SecMulRes(〈n〉) in parallel.
4: P1 computes f1 ← fm1 + fn1 .
5: P2 computes f2 ← fm2 + fn2 .
6: Return [[f ]].
Algorithm 10 Secure Cosine Protocol [[f ]]← SecCos([[x]])
Input: Shared secret [[x]].
Output: Shared secret [[f ]] such that f = cosx.
1: P1 computes m1 ← sinx1, n1 ← cosx1.
2: P2 computes m2 ← sinx2, n2 ← cosx2.
3: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute [[fm]] ←
SecMulRes(〈m〉), [[fn]]← SecMulRes(〈n〉) in parallel.
4: P1 computes f1 ← fn1 − fm1 .
5: P2 computes f2 ← fn2 − fm2 .
6: Return [[f ]].
the problem is transformed into how to convert shares.
Algorithm 9 first computes the sine and cosine of each
share, then divides above four trigonometric results into
two groups of multiplicative shares, and the rest is to call
SecMulRes for each group in parallel.
Secure cosine is to compute [[f ]] ← cos[[x]]. Similar to
Algorithm 9, it is easy to design secure cosine protocol that
securely implements cosine according to the identity
cos(x1 + x2) = cosx1 · cosx2 − sinx1 · sinx2. (6)
Algorithm 10 shows the details.
Theorem 9. Algorithm 9 and Algorithm 10 are correct and
secure in honest-but-curios model.
Proof: For the correctness of Algorithm 9, there are
f =f1 + f2 = f
m
1 + f
n
1 + f
m
2 + f
n
2 = f
m + fn
=m+ n = m1m2 + n1n2 = sinx1 · cosx2 + cosx1 · sinx2
= sin(x1 + x2) = sinx.
Referring to the above proof, it is trivial to prove the
correctness of Algorithm 10. Since SecMulRes is secure
and Algorithm 9 and Algorithm 10 contain no additional
communication, security of both is trivial.
Tangent, cotangent, cosecant and secant could be defined
by sine and cosine as sine/cosine, cosine/sine, 1/sine, and
1/cosine respectively. Therefore, constructing secure proto-
cols for these functions is merely a combination of SecSin,
SecCos, and SecPow, and it is trivial to prove the correct-
ness and security of them.
5.3 Inverse Trigonometric Functions
The inverse trigonometric functions is the final problem to
integrity basic elementary functions. However, there is no
angle sum and difference identity for inverse trigonometric
functions. Therefore, we have to settle for second best by
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TABLE 1
Complexities of protocols
(Here, l is the bit-width of the element in practice, and n denotes the
number of inputs)
Protocol Round Complexities Communications
SecMul 1 4l
SecMulRes 1 2l
SecAddRes 2 2l
SecCom 3 2l + 2
SecExp 1 2l
SecLog 2 2l
SecPow 3 (2n+ 2)l
SecSin, SecCos 1 4l
Division 3 6l
Product min(3, dlog2 ne) (2n+ 2)l, (4n− 4)l
Tagent, Cotangent 4 14l
Secant, Cosecant 4 12l
using Taylor series. For instance, arcsin(x) can be calculated
using Maclaurin series:
arcsin(x) = x+
(
1
2
)
x3
3
+
(
1 · 3
2 · 4
)
x5
5
+
(
1 · 3 · 5
2 · 4 · 6
)
x7
7
+· · ·
(7)
Since secure power protocol is with constant round com-
plexities, high order Taylor series (Maclaurin series) will not
increase additional interaction between parties. As a result,
we could increase the order of Taylor series as much as
possible to improve accuracy.
6 COMPLEXITY
Table 1 summarized round complexities and communica-
tions of all the protocols in this paper. We can see that all
proposed protocols have low constant round complexities
and low communications, which is suitable for practice.
The round complexities of SecCom are 3 which contains
2 rounds of SecAddRes and 1 round of revealing signs. As
the sign of secret over MSS is precisely in ASS form, parties
do not need to know the exact result of comparison in some
scenarios. Consequently, SecAddRes can be regarded as
secure comparison protocol with semaphore, and its round
complexities are 2.
Secure product is available in two methods: 1) recur-
sively splitting input sequences in half and then computing
each pair in parallel; 2) as a special case of power. The
Round complexities of the two methods are dlog2 ne and
the constant 3, and communications are (4n − 4)l and
(2n + 2)l, respectively. Hence the round complexities of
product are min(3, dlog2 ne) by selecting the appropriate
method according to the number of inputs.
The round complexities of secure protocols for tangent,
cotangent, cosecant and secant defined by sine and cosine
are 4, while what using the angle sum and difference iden-
tities are 4 as well.
Table 2 compared the complexities of secure protocols for
comparison and division with previous work, and showed
that our scheme is more efficient.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we firstly proposed two basic protocols, multi-
plicative resharing and additive resharing, which can switch
shared secrets. And then, based on this ability, protocols
for comparison, exponentiation, logarithm, power, product,
division and trigonometric functions were proposed, where
product and division derived from power. Additionally, we
discussed the cases about power with real exponent or with
secret exponent in Appendix, and constructed protocols for
them. All the protocols proposed in this paper are composed
of arithmetic operations and contains no bit-level opera-
tion with low constant round complexities, and have been
proven secure in honest-but-curios model.
Specially, secure power protocol with constant round
complexities provides the possibility of higher order Taylor
series which can approximate most functions that include
those not implemented in this paper and will benefit from
higher order. Meanwhile secure sine and cosine protocols
provide the possibility of efficient Fourier series which can
approximate an arbitrary function in a period.
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APPENDIX
POWER WITH REAL OR SECRET EXPONENT
When the exponent is real as well as the base is negative,
Algorithm 8 will produce wrong result, since the identity
3 doesn’t hold under this case. However, we note that the
identity
uα = (−1)α|u|α, (8)
where u is a negative number. This provides us with an
idea: firstly, compute |[[x]]|α as with Algorithm 8, secondly,
multiply each share by (−1)α if x is negative. We thus
constructed secure power with real exponent protocol as
described in Algorithm 11, where to simplify the problem,
the case with one multiplier is considered. The protocol is
with complexity of 4 rounds and 4l + 2 communications.
Besides, it should be emphasized that the coefficient
(−1)α usually not only directs the real field to the com-
plex field, but also leads to multiple results. Although all
protocols in this paper also available in the complex field
with necessary adjustment, many practical applications do
not need to enter the complex field. In this case, it only need
to compute |[[x]]|α without multiplying (−1)α. For example,
batch normalization [52] involving root operation assumes
that the input is positive.
Theorem 10. Algorithm 11 is correct and UC-secure in
honest-but-curios model.
Proof: For correctness, if x is negative, there are
f = (−1)α(f1 + f2) = (−1)α(v1v2) = (−1)α|u|α = xα.
If not, it is same as Algorithm 8. Since SecAddRes, SecCom,
SecMulRes are are secure and this algorithm contains no
additional communication, security is trivial.
Algorithm 11 Secure Power with Real Exponent Protocol
[[f ]]← SecPRE([[x]], α)
Input: Shared secret [[x]] and public real α.
Output: Shared secret [[f ]] such that f = xα.
1: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute 〈u〉 ←
SecAddRes([[x]]).
2: P1 computes v1 ← |u1|α.
3: P2 computes v2 ← |u2|α.
4: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute [[f ]] ←
SecMulRes(〈v〉).
5: if SecCom([[x]], [[0]]) == −1 then
6: P1 computes f1 ← f1 · (−1)α.
7: P2 computes f2 ← f2 · (−1)α.
8: end if
9: Return [[f ]].
We now discuss the case that even the exponent is a
shared secret. Since share cannot be exponentiated directly,
we need to use the identity
α lnu = lnuα,
to convert exponentiation into multiplication. In addition,
as a shared secret, the exponent is almost impossible to
be an integer, thereby we should also classify the positive
and negative of the base. Algorithm 12 shows the details of
secure power with secret exponent protocol. The protocol
requires complexity of 5 rounds and 8l+2 communications.
Theorem 11. Algorithm 12 is correct and UC-secure in
honest-but-curios model.
Proof: For correctness, if x is negative, there are
f =f1 + f2 = v1 · v2 = es1 · (−1)y1 · es2 · (−1)y2 = (−1)yes
=(−1)yety = (−1)yey ln |x| = (−1)y|x|y = xy.
Otherwise, it is trivial. Since this algorithm consists of only
secure protocols and contains no additional communication,
security is trivial.
Algorithm 12 Secure Power with Secret Exponent Protocol
[[f ]]← SecPSE([[x]], [[y]])
Input: Shared secrets [[x]] and [[y]].
Output: Shared secret [[f ]] such that f = xy .
1: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute [[t]]← SecLog([[x]]).
2: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute [[s]] ←
SecMul([[t]], [[y]]).
3: if SecCom([[x]], [[0]]) == 1 then
4: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute [[f ]] ←
SecExp([[s]]).
5: Return [[f ]].
6: else if SecCom([[x]], [[0]]) == −1 then
7: P1 computes v1 ← es1 · (−1)y1 .
8: P2 computes v2 ← es2 · (−1)y2 .
9: P1 and P2 collaboratively compute [[f ]] ←
SecMulRes(〈v〉).
10: Return [[f ]].
11: else
12: Return [[0]].
13: end if
